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I. INTRODUCTION
ISPUTES between employers and employees are nothing new,
but in recent years the number of employee-initiated lawsuits
has increased dramatically. Since 1969, the number of employ-
ment discrimination claims filed in federal court has increased over two
* The author wishes to thank visiting Professor Richard A. Bales for his ideas and
assistance with this Comment.
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thousand percent.' The rising cost of defending this litigation has led
many employers to consider methods of alternative dispute resolution,
including negotiation, arbitration, or mediation.
Arbitration has proved to be a popular method for employers to re-
solve disputes with employees for several reasons. Employers prefer to
keep such disputes away from juries who may be sympathetic to employ-
ees with whom the jury members can relate.2 Arbitration is generally
quicker and less expensive than traditional litigation, although the in-
crease in the number of arbitrated cases is beginning to diminish this ben-
eficial aspect of arbitration.3 In addition, arbitration can be a more
private method of dispute resolution resulting in less negative publicity
for the employer.4 Another benefit of the privacy associated with arbitra-
tion is the reduced likelihood that other employees' morale will be af-
fected by the dispute.5 Finally, as distinguished from judges who may not
have the time to educate themselves on the most current changes in em-
ployment law, organizations such as the American Arbitration Associa-
tion can provide arbitrators that specialize in employment disputes. 6
Arbitration, however, does have its negatives. Generally, there is no
meaningful appeals process from an arbitration proceeding. 7 Discovery is
sometimes limited, which generally harms the employee more than the
employer, but can limit the employer's basis for encouraging settlement
through its greater resources to expound labor-intensive discovery re-
quests on the employee's lawyer. 8 Employers may also forego some ac-
cepted defenses and waive the employee's strict burden of proof that
federal judges would enforce, but arbitrators may not be bound to fol-
low.9 Finally, the ease and finality of arbitration might encourage a plain-
tiff's lawyer to take a case that he would not otherwise take, thus giving
more employees incentive to bring employment claims.10 In some cases,
the relative informality of arbitration may encourage employees to pur-
sue their claims pro se.11
1. See Joseph I. Goldstein & Martin F. Payson, Alternate Dispute Resolution of Em-
ployment Matters in the Public Sector, SPECTRUM: J. ST. GOV'T, Sept. 1, 1995, at 36.
2. See Richard A. Bales, Compulsory Arbitration of Employment Claims: A Practical
Guide to Designing and Implementing Enforceable Agreements, 47 BAYLOR L. REv. 591,
593 (1995).
3. See id.
4. See id.; Robert J. Lewton, Comment, Are Mandatory Binding Arbitration Require-
ments a Viable Solution for Employers Seeking to Avoid Litigating Statutory Employment
Discrimination, 59 ALB. L. REV. 991 (1996).
5. See Lewton, supra note 4 at 993; American Arbitration Association, Resolving
Employment Disputes: A Manual on Drafting Procedures, 1993 WL 495884, at *1 (1993).
6. See AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL RULES FOR THE RESOLU-
TION OF EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES; ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION RULES 6 (1996). '
7. See William M. Howard, Arbitrating Employment Discrimination Claims: Do You
Really Have To? Do You Really Want To?, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 255, 287 (1994).
8. See id.
9. See id. at 288.
10. See id. at 288-89.
11. See RICHARD A. BALES, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION: THE GRAND EXPERIMENT
IN EMPLOYMENT (forthcoming) (manuscript at 159, on file with SMU Law Review).
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Despite any negative aspects of arbitration, more and more employers
are implementing arbitration agreements with their employees. A recent
study performed by the United States General Accounting Office found
that while only 1.3% of employers use arbitration agreements outside of
the collective bargaining context, 8.4% were considering instituting such
agreements. 12 This percentage may already be out-of-date when consid-
ering the American Arbitration Association's estimate that employment
arbitration claims increased seventy percent between 1994 and 1995.13
One problem facing employers who wish to utilize an arbitration policy
for employment disputes is how to implement such a policy. Employers
may include provisions in employment applications, employment con-
tracts, employee handbooks, or even adopt a stand-alone arbitration pol-
icy statement. Although almost every method of implementation has
been contested at one time or another, agreements to arbitrate between
employers and new or prospective employees have generally been easier
to enforce.1 4 The problem facing most employers has been how to insti-
tute such an arbitration agreement with current employees who did not
sign arbitration agreements at the time their employment commenced.
This Comment will focus on methods of implementing agreements man-
dating arbitration between employers and their existing employees,
trends in the enforcement of such agreements, public and government
reaction to the enforcement of mandatory employment arbitration agree-
ments, and the policy reasons for the enforcement. or non-enforcement of
these agreements. 15
12. See Lewton, supra note 4, at 991 n.3.
13. See Diane E. Lewis, Mandatory-Arbitration Controversy Grows; Some Must Waive
Right to a Trial on Work Issues, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Sept. 30, 1996, at 4D.
14. See, e.g., Degaetano v. Smith Barney, Inc., 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 401
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (arbitration agreement was enforced where plaintiff signed a "Principles
of Employment" agreement at the time of hiring in which she agreed to observe the com-
pany's arbitration procedure); Golenia v. Bob Baker Toyota, 915 F. Supp. 201 (S.D. Cal.
1996) (employee was bound by arbitration agreement he signed during the application
process).
15. The focus of this Comment will be on arbitration agreements between individual
employees and their employers. The topic of arbitration in the context of collective bar-
gaining agreements is a topic unto itself, and many articles have addressed the topic more
fully. See, e.g., Don A. Banta et al., Labor Arbitration and the Law of Collective Bargain-
ing Agreements, 7 LAB. LAW. 747 (1991); Charles B. Craver, Labor Arbitration as a Contin-
uation of the Collective Bargaining Process, 66 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 571 (1990); Stephen W.
Skrainka, The Utility of Arbitration Agreements in Employment Manuals and Collective
Bargaining Agreements for Resolving Civil Rights, Age, and ADA Claims, 37 ST. Louis U.
L.J. 985 (1993). In addition, the securities industry has a long history of requiring employ-
ees to sign arbitration agreements as part of their registration with national securities ex-
changes such as the New York Stock Exchange. Arbitration agreements signed by
employees in the securities industry involve issues that are wholly distinct from this discus-
sion. For a more complete treatment of arbitration agreements in the securities industry,
see, for example, Mahlon M. Frankhauser, Arbitration: The Alternative to Securities and
Employment Litigation, 50 Bus. LAW. 1333 (1995); Margaret M. Harding, The Cause and
Effect of the Eligibility Rule in Securities Arbitration: The Further Aggravation of Unequal
Bargaining Power, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 109 (1996); Megan L. Dunphy, Comment,
Mandatory Arbitration: Stripping Securities Industry Employees of Their Civil Rights, 44
CATH. U. L. REv. 1169 (1995). Note, however, that the National Association of Securities
Dealers, Inc. voted on August 7, 1997, to eliminate mandatory arbitration of employment
19981
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II. HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION
Traditionally, many courts were hesitant to enforce even those arbitra-
tion agreements that were entered into voluntarily after arms-length bar-
gaining. 16 In response to this hesitance, Congress passed the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA), signed into law by President Calvin Coolidge in
1925, with the purpose of putting arbitration agreements "upon the same
footing as other contracts."'1 7 The Act provides:
A written provision in any ... contract evidencing a transaction in-
volving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter
arising out of such contract ... or an agreement in writing to submit
to arbitration an existing controversy ... shall be valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract. 18
Section 1 of the Act, however, provides that "nothing herein contained
shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or
any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce."'19
The proper application of the section 1 exclusion has been one of the
most hotly debated issues arising under the Act. Courts have differed in
interpretation of the section, with the majority concluding that the exclu-
sion should be "limited to workers employed in the transportation indus-
tries or engaged in the actual movement of goods in interstate
commerce."20 A minority of courts has concluded, based upon the
broader definition of interstate commerce, that the exclusion was meant
to apply to all employment contracts. 21 Only the Ninth Circuit has not
yet ruled on the issue, but at least one district court within the circuit has
discrimination claims. See Arbitration: Elimination of Mandatory Arbitration of Discrimi-
nation Claims Proposed by NASD, 153 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 1 (Aug. 8, 1997).
16. See, e.g., Insurance Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445 (1874): "[A man] may submit his
particular suit by his own consent to an arbitration .... He cannot, however, bind himself
in advance by an agreement, which may be specifically enforced, thus to forfeit his rights at
all times and on all occasions, whenever the case may be presented." Id. at 451 (Hunt, J.,
dictum).
17. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994).
18. Id. § 2.
19. Id. § 1.
20. Rojas v. TK Communications, Inc., 87 F.3d 745, 748 n.2 (5th Cir. 1996); see also
Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. Bates, 71 F.3d 592, 596-602 (6th Cir. 1995); Miller Brewing
Co. v. Brewery Workers Local Union No. 9, 739 F.2d 1159, 1162 (7th Cir. 1984); Erving v.
Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064, 1069 (2d Cir. 1972); Dickstein v. duPont,
443 F.2d 783, 785 (1st Cir. 1971); Tenney Eng'g, Inc. v. United Elec. Radio & Mach. Work-
ers of Am., Local 437, 207 F.2d 450, 453 (3d Cir. 1953).
21. See, e.g., United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers of Am. v. Miller Metal Prods., 215
F.2d 221 (4th Cir. 1954). Some commentators have divided courts into four approaches on
the issue. See, e.g., Christopher A. Barreca & Eric T. Levine, Developments in Arbitration
of Employment Claims/Cases, in THE SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION 43D ANNUAL
INSTITUTE ON LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 2-3 (1996) (dividing the approaches into the
following categories: (1) exemption applies to all employment contracts; (2) exemption
applies to those employed in the transportation industry; (3) exemption applies to those
directly engaged in the movement of goods in interstate commerce; and (4) exemption
applies to collective bargaining agreements).
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sided with the majority's more narrow exclusion. 22 The Supreme Court
has not directly addressed the issue, but some courts and commentators
have interpreted its holding in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. as
suggesting that section 1 should be interpreted narrowly to include only
transportation workers. 23
The plaintiff in Gilmer was hired by the defendants as their manager of
financial services, and was required to register with the New York Stock
Exchange. His application for registration with the Exchange included an
arbitration agreement. When Gilmer was terminated at the age of sixty-
two, he filed an age discrimination claim with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, and then brought suit in federal court. The
Court enforced the arbitration agreement, but refused to address the is-
sue of whether section 1 of the FAA applied to all contracts of employ-
ment, holding instead that the agreement was part of the registration
process, and not in Gilmer's employment contract.24 The Court did hold
that statutory claims could be arbitrated, and that doing so did not force
the parties to forego any substantive rights provided by the statute.
25
Subsequent courts, however, have interpreted Gilmer's failure to address
the issue of whether the FAA applies to all employment contracts, or
only to those of employees who are engaged in the transportation indus-
try or otherwise in the movement of goods in interstate commerce, as
permission to continue adopting the more narrow interpretation of sec-
tion 1.26
The arguments for a more limited interpretation of section 1 of the
Federal Arbitration Act often stem from the legislative history of the Act.
Its legislative history shows that certain groups in the transportation in-
dustry, namely the Seamen's Union, lobbied to have the industry re-
moved from the Act's coverage. The Third Circuit was the first to
analyze section 1 in Tenney Engineering v. United Electric Radio &
Machine Workers of America, Local 437, which looked to a report from
the American Bar Association's Committee on Commerce, Trade and
Commercial Law to find that the drafters wanted to exclude the contracts
of seamen from the Act because the Seamen's Union opposed the Act on
the grounds that their wages were already subject to federal admiralty
jurisdiction. 27 Other transportation industry workers, such as railroad
employees, also had special procedures for dispute resolution already in
22. See Golenia, 915 F. Supp at 203; see also Brown v. KFC Nat'l Management Co.,
921 P.2d 146, 156-57 (Haw. 1996) for an interesting discussion of the split between the
circuits in the interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act's section 1 employment
exclusion.
23. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). See also BALES,
supra note 2, Howard, supra note 7, and Lewton, supra note 4, for a discussion of the
impact of Gilmer on the enforcement of employment arbitration agreements.
24. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 n.2.
25. See id. at 26.
26. See Rojas, 87 F.3d at 747-48; Topf v. Warnaco, Inc., 942 F. Supp. 762, 765 (D. Conn.
1996); Maye v. Smith Barney, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 100, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
27. See Brown, 921 P.2d at 156 (citing Tenney Eng'g v. United Elec. Radio & Mach.
Workers of Am., Local 437, 207 F.2d 450, 452 (3d Cir. 1953)).
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place, according to Tenney, so it made sense to exclude these workers
from coverage under the Act.28 From this interpretation, the court deter-
mined that the intent of the phrase "any other class of workers engaged
in foreign or interstate commerce" was intended to include only those
similarly engaged in the transportation industry under the rule of ejusdem
generis.29 Courts have also rationalized that "[if] Congress had intended
to exclude all contracts of employment from FAA coverage, Congress
could simply have used statutory language in § 1 similar to the following:
'... but nothing herein contained shall apply to any contracts of employ-
ment."' 30 Another rationale for limiting the FAA exclusion is the often-
stated rule that any doubts over arbitrable issues should be resolved in
favor of arbitration.31
Opponents of this narrow reading of the exclusion argue that courts
should not apply ejusdem generis or resort to legislative history to inter-
pret a statute whose language is not ambiguous. 32 They argue that the
phrase "any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate com-
merce" is clear and susceptible to only one interpretation. As one court
put it, "[t]he purpose of [ejusdem generis's] use is to carry out, not defeat,
the legislative intent. '33 Another argument against a limited interpreta-
tion of section 1 is that courts have confused favoritism for arbitration
with a narrow interpretation of section 1. According to one court, "Con-
gress enacted the FAA as the articulation of the federal policy for favor-
ing arbitration. It is redundant and inappropriate to use the very policy
[promoted by the Federal Arbitration Act] to assist in the interpretation
of its own codification. '34 Finally, the same court, despite its criticism of
looking to the legislative history of the Act, found congressional intent to
exclude all contracts of employment from the history of the Act.
A review of the legislative history of the FAA confirms that the FAA
was never meant to incorporate employment contracts with the req-
uisite effects on interstate commerce within its scope. The Act was
originally drafted by a committee of the American Bar Association
to overturn a common-law rule which precluded enforcement of
agreements to arbitrate in commercial contracts .... At a hearing of
28. See id.
29. See id. at 156 n.13 ("Pursuant to the rule of ejusdem generis, which is an 'estab-
lished rule of statutory construction, where words of general description follow the
enumeration of certain things, those words are restricted in their meaning to objects of like
kind and character with those specified' (citations omitted)." It follows from this that if the
language "seamen, and railroad employees" is followed by general language about other
employees, it should be interpreted to mean employees of a like kind, which would be
those employees in the transportation industry.
30. Rojas, 87 F.3d at 748.
31. See id. at 749.
32. See, e.g., Arce v. Cotton Club of Greenville, Inc., 883 F. Supp. 117, 121 (N.D. Miss.
1995) (arguing for the exclusion of all contracts of employment from coverage under the
FAA). Arce's precedential value may be limited after the Fifth Circuit's decision in Rojas
v. TK Communications, but the court's opinion encompasses many of the arguments used
by opponents of a narrow interpretation of FAA section 1.
33. Arce, 883 F. Supp. at 121 (citations omitted).
34. Id. at 119 n.2.
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the Senate Judiciary Committee, the chairman of the ABA commit-
tee responsible for drafting the bill stated that the bill "is not in-
tended [to] be an act referring [to] labor disputes, at all. It is purely
an act to give the merchants the right or privilege of sitting down and
agreeing with each other as to what their damages are, if they want
to do it.''35
Despite the controversy over the section 1 exclusion, courts have gen-
erally enforced employment agreements that mandate the arbitration of
federal statutory claims, including those arising under the Employee Re-
tirement Income Security Act, 36 the Americans with Disabilities Act, 37
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,38 the Federal Railroad Safety Act,39 and the
Equal Pay Act, 40 as well as a variety of state statutory claims under the
Federal Arbitration Act.41
III. METHODS OF IMPLEMENTING MANDATORY
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS WITH CURRENT
EMPLOYEES
In determining whether to enforce arbitration, a court will generally
engage in a four-step inquiry:
[f]irst, it must determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate; sec-
ond, it must determine the scope of that agreement; third, if federal
statutory claims are asserted, it must consider whether Congress in-
tended for those claims to be nonarbitrable; and fourth, if the court
concludes that some, but not all, of the claims in the case are arbitra-
ble, it must then determine whether to stay the balance of the pro-
ceedings pending arbitration.42
For purposes of the arbitration implementation process, the first step will
be crucial in order to overcome potential challenges to a mandatory arbi-
tration policy. When arbitration is made mandatory in the workplace,
many employees may later argue that they did not agree to arbitration or
were coerced into agreeing to the policy in order to keep their jobs. Fur-
ther, whether contractual consideration for the agreement exists will
often be at issue. The method of implementation may be determinative
in whether such challenges will be successful.
35. Id. at 122 (citing Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 311 (6th Cir.
1991) (quoting Hearings on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before the Subcomm. on the Judiciary, 67th
Cong. 9 (1923)).
36. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-
1461 (1994).
37. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
38. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h-6 (1994).
39. Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-458, 84 Stat. 971 (1970) (repealed).
40. Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (1963).
41. See Barreca & Levine, supra note 21, at 9-13. See generally BALES, supra note 11,
for a discussion of state and federal statutory claims for which courts have compelled
arbitration.
42. Genesco, Inc. v. T. Kakiuchi & Co., 815 F.2d 840, 844 (2d Cir. 1987) (citations
omitted); Hinson v. Jusco Co. Ltd., 868 F. Supp. 145, 148 (D.S.C. 1994).
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A. MODIFYING THE EMPLOYEE HANDBOOK
The Federal Arbitration Act requires that agreements to arbitrate be in
writing, but it does not require that they be signed by the parties. 43
Courts will follow ordinary contract principles to determine if arbitration
agreements should be enforced. 4 For example, courts might not imply
constructive consent to enforce an arbitration agreement in the absence
of a party's actual intention. Such actual intention may either be express
(such as a written or oral statement) or implied from the party's con-
duct.45 Since consent can be implied, employers often create a written
arbitration policy that they impose unilaterally on employees in an at-
tempt to mandate arbitration of all workplace disputes without imple-
menting individual arbitration agreements with every employee. An
example of such a written policy would be an amendment to an employee
handbook or manual.
Modification of employee handbooks or manuals to include arbitration
agreements has sometimes bound employees to arbitrate claims against
employers, despite the fact that employees may not have signed an ex-
plicit agreement to arbitrate. As with other arbitration agreements, em-
ployees must presumably know about the arbitration clause in order to be
bound by it.46 Under several recent challenges, the trend has been to-
ward the enforcement of arbitration clauses in employee handbook
amendments.
In Carlson v. Hutzel Corp.,47 the court enforced an arbitration provi-
sion contained in a written supplement that amended the employee man-
ual. The plaintiffs were non-union nursing administrators at the
defendant's hospital who brought constructive discharge claims against
the defendant. The defendant had unilaterally changed a written policy
statement during the plaintiffs' employment to mandate binding arbitra-
tion, but did not seek the consent of the employees. The defendant chal-
43. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 2, 3 (1994); Genesco, 815 F.2d at 840; A/S Custodia v. Lessin Int'l,
Inc., 503 F.2d 318, 320 (2d Cir. 1974); Ocean Indus., Inc. v. Soros Assoc. Int'l, Inc., 328 F.
Supp. 944, 947 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); but see Nicholas A. Califano, M.D., Inc. v. Shearson Leh-
man Bros., Inc., 690 F. Supp. 1354, 1356 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (stating that "enforcement of
unsigned arbitration agreements is the exception, not the rule").
44. See A/S Custodia, 503 F.2d at 320; Western Int'l Media Corp. v. Johnson, 754 F.
Supp. 871, 873 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (looking to course of conduct to find arbitration agreement
enforceable); Diskin v. J.P. Stephens & Co., Inc., 652 F. Supp. 553, 556 (D. Mass. 1987)
(using the "merchant exception" of the New York Uniform Commercial Code § 2-104 to
enforce an unsigned arbitration agreement); but see Carlson v. Hutzel Corp., 455 N.W.2d
335, 338 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) (enforcing an arbitration agreement without using general
contractual principles); see also infra text accompanying notes 47-51 for a discussion of
Carlson.
45. See Shaffer v. Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 756 F. Supp. 365, 369 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
46. See Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 61 (1995) (holding there must be "at least a knowing agreement to arbitrate" before
employees give up any procedural rights). For a more complete discussion of Prudential,
see Recent Cases: Arbitration-Statutory Claims-Ninth Circuit Imposes Knowing Waiver
Standard for Mandatory Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Claims-Prudential Insurance
Co. v. Lai., 109 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1996).
47. 455 N.W.2d 335 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990).
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lenged the plaintiffs' wrongful discharge claim on the grounds that they
were required to arbitrate any employment disputes, but the plaintiffs ar-
gued that the unilateral arbitration policy should not be enforced. Under
the court's analysis in Carlson, mutual assent to the term of employment
was not required.48 The court held that a unilateral change to a written
policy statement was enforceable in contract, even though the right to
such enforcement did not arise under general contract principles. 49 Be-
cause the contract rights did not arise out of general contract principles,
the court found that the strict application of contractual modification
rules was not necessarily appropriate.50 Thus, according to the court, no
preliminary negotiations or meeting of the minds were required because
once the employer makes the personnel procedures known to employees,
"the employment relationship is presumably enhanced."''s
When the tables are turned, however, and it is the employee who is
seeking to bind the employer to an arbitration agreement found in an
employment handbook, the courts have not always been as willing to
compel arbitration. For example, in Reilly v. Stroehmann Bros.,52 the
plaintiff was a salesman who was discharged by the defendant for alleged
misconduct. He requested binding arbitration to review his termination,
stating that the employee handbook provided for binding arbitration.
The relevant provision of the handbook read:
Stroehmann's management feels strongly about maintaining fairness
in its hiring and disciplinary practices. That is why we have designed
a free and completely neutral third party arbitration procedure for
all non-union employees. Under this program, if you are discharged
for any reason, you may have an Arbitrator appointed by the
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION to hear and decide
whether you have been discharged properly. The decision of the Ar-
bitrator appointed to hear the case will be FINAL and BINDING on
both sides .... 53
The court refused to compel the employer to arbitrate, however, finding
that the handbook provision was simply a description of a program rather
than a mandatory arbitration policy. According to the court,
A description of an arbitration program for discharged non-union
employees must not be construed as a rule or regulation anymore
than the life insurance benefits or other benefits described in the
handbook. The arbitration provision does not require that employ-
ees submit discharges to binding arbitration, instead, non-union em-
ployees "may" submit to arbitration if they so choose.54
Unlike Carlson, most courts that have found arbitration provisions
contained in employee handbook amendments to be enforceable have
48. See id. at 339.
49. See id. at 338.
50. See id.
51. Id.
52. 532 A.2d 1212 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).
53. Id. at 1214.
54. Id. at 1215.
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done so under general contract principles, finding some form of accept-
ance on the part of the employee. In Lang v. Burlington Northern Rail-
road Co. ,5 for example, the plaintiff had been an employee of Burlington
Northern since 1965. In 1991, Burlington Northern adopted a policy re-
quiring arbitration of all claims relating to termination of employment
that could not be resolved internally.56 Employees were informed of the
new policy via a letter that explained the policy and included three modi-
fied pages to be inserted in the employee handbook.57 The policy pro-
vided in part that: "All claims, disputes, or issues, related to or arising
out of the termination of employment or exempt status of an employee of
the company shall be submitted for resolution exclusively by arbitration
and only after all internal resolution efforts have been exhausted." 58 The
court enforced the arbitration clause, stating that clear and definite policy
language in employee manuals may constitute a binding unilateral con-
tract under Minnesota law.59 The court found that arbitration was a term
of employment that was presented as an offer to the employee and was
accepted with sufficient consideration by the fact that the employee re-
mained on the job, although he was free to leave.60
In Kinnebrew v. Gulf Insurance Co.,61 a case similar to Lang, employ-
ees received a copy of Gulf Insurance's new mandatory arbitration policy
with an explanatory memorandum in the mail, and Gulf outlined the pol-
icy in the company's employee handbook. 62 The handbook read:
If the internal dispute resolution procedure does not resolve the con-
cern, the dispute may be submitted to binding arbitration in accord-
ance with [Gulf Insurance's] employment arbitration policy.
Arbitration is an essential element of your employment relationship
and is a condition of your employment. This policy makes arbitra-
tion required, and exclusive, for the resolution of all employment
disputes which may arise .... 63
The plaintiff in Kinnebrew had not been terminated, but instead brought
claims against her employer under the Texas Commission on Human
Rights Act and the Equal Pay Act for allegedly paying her less than the
male who had previously held her position. The court relied on Lang in
finding that an arbitration agreement instituted during an employee's pe-
riod of employment was enforceable if the employee continued to work
for the employer after the policy was instituted. 64 Unlike Minnesota,
however, Texas courts have generally held that employee handbooks are
55. 835 F. Supp. 1104 (D. Minn. 1993).
56. See id. at 1105.
57. See id.
58. Id.
59. See id. at 1106 (citing Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 626-27
(Minn. 1983)).
60. See Lang, 835 F. Supp. at 1106.
61. 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 189 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 28, 1994).
62. See id. at 190.
63. Id. at 189.
64. See id. at 191.
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not binding employment contracts in the absence of language to the con-
trary, although a few have held that employees may unilaterally be bound
by new terms of employment. 65 The court failed to address the issue of
whether employee manuals are binding on employees in Texas or to ad-
dress any distinctions at all between Texas and Minnesota law, but simply
used Lang for the proposition that "federal courts do not hesitate to find
an enforceable agreement to arbitrate when an arbitration policy is insti-
tuted during an employee's employment and the employee continues to
work for the employer thereafter. '66
As one commentator has suggested, "[t]he Kinnebrew decision is re-
markable for its implications. If courts follow Kinnebrew, employers in
Texas will be free to unilaterally insert an arbitration agreement in an
employee manual, significantly limit available statutory remedies, and
prevail in the face of an employee judicial challenge. '67
In another handbook modification case, Nghiem v. NEC Electronic,
Inc.,68 the employee signed an employment contract with NEC in 1989,
which did not provide for arbitration and that contained a clause stating
that:
[N]o terms or provisions of this Agreement shall be varied or modi-
fied by any prior or subsequent act of either me or the Company
except that the Company and I may subsequently amend this agree-
ment by written instruments that specifically refer to this agreement
and that are executed in the same manner as this agreement. 69
Nghiem refused to sign a modified version of the employment contract
because it contained an arbitration provision, but did sign an acknowledg-
ment of his receipt of a new employee handbook that described a four-
step dispute resolution process that required arbitration as the fourth and
final step.70 Despite his refusal to sign the employment contract, Nghiem
apparently thought he had no alternative but to arbitrate and wrote a
letter to NEC's director of human resources requesting arbitration. Sub-
sequently, he proceeded with the arbitration, although he said he thought
it was non-binding. Holding that "while the FAA 'requires a writing, it
does not require that the writing be signed by the parties,"' the court
found that the employee handbook, the signed acknowledgment, and
Nghiem's letter to the human resources director constituted writings me-
morializing an agreement to arbitrate.71 The court suggested, though,
65. See Hicks v. Baylor Univ. Med. Ctr., 789 S.W.2d 299, 302 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990,
writ denied) (holding that an employee handbook is not a binding contract of employment
that would overcome the presumption of employment-at-will); see infra text accompanying
notes 74-77 for a discussion of modifications to terms of employment that are binding on
employees.
66. Kinnebrew, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 191.
67. Pierre Levy, Comment, Gilmer Revisited: The Judicial Erosion of Employee Statu-
tory Rights, 26 N.M. L. REV. 455, 466 (1996).
68. 25 F.3d 1437 (9th Cir. 1994).
69. Id. at 1439.
70. See id.
71. Id. at 1439-40.
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that even if the writings were insufficient, Nghiem's conduct in pursuing
arbitration implied an agreement to arbitrate. 72
Most courts will not find an agreement to arbitrate based solely on the
fact that an employee signed an acknowledgment of receipt of an em-
ployee handbook, because the form will usually manifest receipt rather
than assent.73 The majority of courts, instead, will find the requisite mu-
tual assent from conduct implying such assent rather than an express
agreement.
Although it is arguably easier to find an implied agreement to arbitrate
in conduct that appears to imply a willingness to arbitrate such as that in
Nghiem, finding consent in the fact that an employee continues his em-
ployment after an arbitration policy is implemented is more problematic.
Commentators have analogized cases like Lang and Kinnebrew to cases
in which employees are bound to new terms of employment such as
changes in pay structure, benefits, or security measures, or by remaining
on the job after being informed of the new terms.74 This comparison ig-
nores a small but significant distinction between an arbitration policy and
other terms of employment. In an employment-at-will relationship, an
employer may unilaterally modify the terms of employment, giving the
employee two alternatives: resign, or remain employed under the new
terms of employment. 75 If the employee remains employed and does not
abide by the terms, he may presumably be terminated. The difference in
the case of arbitration is that in many instances, at the time the parties are
quarreling over the arbitration agreement, the employee has already
been terminated for reasons unrelated to the arbitration policy. This may
be different than a dispute over any other term of employment, such as
salary, where the employee is likely still working for the employer at the
time the dispute ensues. If the presumption in most states is that an em-
ployee handbook is not a binding contract in an employment-at-will rela-
72. See id. at 1440. Nghiem completed the arbitration process as set forth in the hand-
book, but claimed he did not intend for it to be binding and wrote to the American Arbi-
tration Association asking for a trial de novo and confirming that the arbitration was not
binding on him.
73. See Barreca & Levine, supra note 21, at 47; but see Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare,
Inc., 113 F.3d 832, 835 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that an acknowledgment form was actually
a separate enforceable contract distinct from other provisions of the handbook based on
the fact that it was on a separate page and contained language different from the rest of the
handbook, such as the terms "I understand" and "I agree").
74. See Bales, supra note 2, at 616; see also Hathaway v. General Mills, Inc., 711
S.W.2d 227, 228-29 (Tex. 1986) (noting that generally, when an employee receives unequiv-
ocal notice of a change in the terms of her employment and continues to work, she has
accepted the modification); Gamble v. Gregg County, 932 S.W.2d 253, 255-56 (Tex. App.-
Texarkana 1996, no writ) (employee could not collect benefits provided under old person-
nel manual because employee had knowledge of the changes in benefits and continued to
work); Jennings v. Minco Tech. Labs, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 497, 499-502 (Tex. App.-Austin
1989, writ denied) (employee was bound by new drug testing policy by continuing to work
after implementation of the policy despite the fact that she argued she should have more
choices than quitting or assenting); but see Robinson v. Ada S. McKinley Community
Servs., Inc., 19 F.3d 359, 364 (7th Cir. 1994) (employee was not bound by changes to em-
ployee manual because no new consideration).
75. See Hathaway, 711 S.W.2d at 229.
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tionship without language to the contrary, 76 then an employer's only
recourse against an employee who continues to work after an employ-
ment policy has been implemented and refuses to abide by the term of
employment is to terminate the employee. The employer does not gener-
ally have any post-termination recourse against the employee in such an
instance, and the result should be no different in the case of arbitration
policies. If the employee has already been terminated, then the employer
should not have another recourse. In many cases, however, courts are
granting employers the post-termination recourse of mandatory arbitra-
tion, forcing the employee to give up procedural rights to a trial by jury.
Employees are thus forced to give up rights after their employment has
terminated without receiving anything in return for giving up that right.
If arbitration clauses in handbooks are enforced in such cases, then em-
ployers are authorized to claim the handbooks are binding contracts only
when it benefits them. 7
7
Arbitration clauses in modified employee handbooks are more closely
analogized to the case of covenants-not-to-compete executed after the
commencement of employment. Covenants-not-to-compete, if binding,
are specifically intended to be applicable to the employee after the termi-
nation of employment. Similarly, most arbitration agreements are in-
tended to be binding, if at all, after employment has been terminated. 78
Both types of agreements restrict the employee's actions beyond the du-
ration of his employment, and both provide the employer with post-ter-
mination recourse against the employee.
Although states vary in their requirements for the enforcement of non-
compete covenants, many will not enforce covenants entered into after
the commencement of employment, at least in the absence of independ-
ent and adequate consideration. 7 9 Some courts have professed to be
76. See Yowell v. Combs, 89 F.3d 542, 544 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Cole v. Conservation
Comm'n, 884 S.W.2d 18, 20-21 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994)); St. Peters v. Shell Oil Co., 77 F.3d
184, 187 (7th Cir. 1996); Hicks v. Baylor Univ. Med. Ctr., 789 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1990, writ denied).
77. See supra text accompanying notes 52-54 for a discussion of Reilly v. Stroehmann
Bros., a case in which employees could not enforce an employee handbook as if it were a
contract when it would benefit them rather than the employer.
78. Admittedly, this analysis ignores employment disputes between employers and
employees when the employment relationship is still intact, but as many employment dis-
putes occur after the employee is terminated, this analysis should encompass the majority
of challenged arbitration agreements. Realistically, the analysis would not change dramati-
cally for an arbitration dispute between an employer and an employee who had not been
terminated, because at the time of the handbook amendment or other method of arbitra-
tion implementation, the employer would not have been able to anticipate when a dispute
might arise and would have intended the arbitration provision to bind the employee both
during and after employment.
79. See Creative Entertainment, Inc. v. Lorenz, 638 N.E.2d 217, 219 (Ill. App. Ct.
1994) (covenant-not-to-compete entered into after commencement of employment must be
ancillary to employment contract, subordinate to contract's main purpose, and supported
by adequate consideration); Ruffing v. 84 Lumber Co., 600 A.2d 545, 548 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1991) (covenant-not-to-compete executed after the commencement of employment was
not enforceable unless the employee receives a benefit or change in status); but see Van
Dyck Printing Co. v. DiNicola, 648 A.2d 898, 901 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1993) (fact that cove-
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more careful in scrutinizing non-compete covenants if they are entered
into after the employee has already commenced employment with the
employer seeking the covenant. 80 The rule in most states is that cove-
nants-not-to-compete must be ancillary to an otherwise enforceable con-
tract, or supported by independent consideration. 81 The Eighth Circuit
has stated, "As a contract, a covenant not to compete must be supported
by consideration to be enforceable .... Ordinarily, this consideration is
furnished by an employee's acceptance of employment from the em-
ployer."82 When the covenant is not entered into at the time of the em-
ployee's acceptance of employment, though, it is not ancillary to the
employment contract, and thus, it must be supported by independent
consideration. 83 Jurisdictions are split on the issue of whether an implied
promise of continued employment is adequate and independent
consideration. 84
The rationale behind the requirement of independent consideration in
the case of covenants-not-to-compete entered into after the commence-
ment of employment is to prevent employers from using unequal bargain-
ing power to exact the promise from the employee.
[T]he development of the jaundiced judicial view toward restrictive
covenants was precisely to counter the unfairness of an employer
utilizing its "unequal bargaining power" to exact promises from its
employee after the employment relationship had commenced ....
"[w]hen the employer fails to inform prospective employees of non-
competitive agreements until after they have accepted jobs, the em-
ployer 'takes undue advantage of the inequality between the
parties." 85
In addition, the length of time after which a covenant-not-to-compete is
considered not to be ancillary to the employment contract can be consid-
nant-not-to-compete was signed after employment had already commenced did not make it
unenforceable on consideration grounds because a final contract had not been completed).
80. See Alston Studios, Inc. v. Lloyd V. Gress & Assocs., 492 F.2d 279, 285 (4th Cir.
1974).
81. See, e.g., Creative Entertainment, 638 N.E.2d at 219; Gagliardi Bros. v. Caputo, 538
F. Supp. 525, 527 (E.D. Pa. 1982); see also Mark B. Wessman, Retaining the Gatekeeper:
Further Reflections on the Doctrine of Consideration, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 713, 795 (1996)
(providing a more complete discussion of cases that have required independent considera-
tion in order to enforce non-compete covenants entered into after the commencement of
employment).
82. Modern Controls, Inc. v. Andreadakis, 578 F.2d 1264, 1267 n.5 (8th Cir. 1978)
(citations omitted).
83. See id. at 1267.
84. See Freeman v. Duluth Clinic, Ltd., 334 N.W.2d 626, 630 (Minn. 1983) ("The mere
continuation of employment can be used to uphold coercive agreements, but the covenant
must be bargained for and provide the employee with real advantages."); Sanborn Mfg.
Co. v. Currie, 500 N.W.2d 161, 164 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (promises of continued employ-
ment are not independent consideration); Ruffing, 600 A.2d at 548 (employee must receive
a benefit or change in status to constitute independent consideration); but see Mattison v.
Johnston, 730 P.2d 286, 289 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (implied promise of continued employ-
ment is adequate consideration to support covenant-not-to-compete entered into after the
inception of employment).
85. College Craft Cos. v. Perry, Civ. No. 3-95-583, 1995 WL 783612, at *10 (D. Minn.
Aug. 9, 1995) (citations omitted).
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erably short, sometimes only a matter of days.86
If the same rationale were applied to arbitration agreements entered
into after the commencement of employment, courts could scrutinize
such agreements for independent consideration. Unless the employer is
in a jurisdiction that views continued employment as adequate considera-
tion, an arbitration clause in an employee handbook would likely be un-
enforceable for lack of consideration. Because most handbook
modifications are presented to the employee unilaterally on a take-it-or-
leave-it basis, employees should not be bound by the modification unless
the employer provides valuable consideration in conjunction with the
handbook modification. If courts enforce arbitration agreements on the
same footing as other contracts, and under general principles of contract
law,8 7 they should carefully scrutinize for independent and adequate con-
sideration in handbook modifications that are made after the employee
commences work with the employer. Both covenants-not-to-compete
and arbitration agreements force employees to give up significant rights,
and as such, employers must also give something of real value in ex-
change for those rights.
B. COMPELLING EMPLOYEES TO SIGN MANDATORY
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
Because mutual assent to a term of employment may not be required
in an at-will employment relationship,88 an employer may be able to con-
dition continued employment on the signing of an arbitration agreement.
On several occasions, courts have enforced such compelled agreements,
even in the face of attacks that the agreements are contracts of adhesion
or lack consideration.
For example, in Hampton v. ITT Corp.,89 the plaintiffs were required to
sign employment contracts that contained arbitration agreements reading
"ITI CFC and EMPLOYEE agree that any dispute between them or
claim by either against the other or any agent or affiliate of the other shall
be resolved by binding arbitration .... 90 The plaintiffs argued that the
employment agreements were not the result of arms-length bargaining,
but the court rejected these arguments, holding that arbitration agree-
ments may be enforced despite arms-length bargaining.91 At least one
court, however, has found a mandatory arbitration agreement to be an
unenforceable adhesion contract when it was given to employers on a
86. See, e.g., id. (concluding that a non-compete covenant signed six days after em-
ployment commenced was considered not ancillary to the employment contract); Modern
Controls, 578 F.2d at 1269 (finding covenant-not-to-compete proposed to the employee at
the commencement of employment, but not signed until nine weeks later was not ancillary
to the employment contract unless supported by independent consideration).
87. See supra notes 17 and 44 and accompanying text.
88. See Carlson, 455 N.W.2d at 339.
89. 829 F. Supp. 202 (S.D. Tex. 1993).
90. Id. at 203.
91. See id. at 204.
19981
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take-it-or-leave-it basis, the arbitrator was associated enough with the
employer to be deemed biased, and the other rules were extremely
favorable to the employer.92
Depending on how the employer structures the agreement, many
courts will not even consider the issues of whether an arbitration is a
contract of adhesion or was induced unfairly. If the attack is on the con-
tract as a whole, rather than an attack on the arbitration provision sepa-
rately, courts will find such attacks subject to arbitration themselves. 93
For this reason, employers who wish to avoid a courtroom might want to
structure the agreement so that it is an employment agreement that con-
tains more than the arbitration provision. Therefore, any attack on the
manner in which the employee's signature was procured will be sent to
arbitration itself.94
In other cases where employee signatures on arbitration agreements
were compelled, the agreements have been upheld despite attacks that
the agreements lacked consideration. For example, in Ryoti v. Paine,
Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc.,95 the plaintiff was required as a condition
of employment to sign an arbitration agreement that was part of his regis-
tration with the New York Stock Exchange. He argued that because the
agreement was not signed until two weeks after his employment com-
menced with the defendant, the agreement was void for failure of consid-
eration. The court found no failure of consideration because the plaintiff
knew when he accepted the job that he would need to satisfy the require-
ments to become registered with the New York Stock Exchange. 96 The
plaintiff's job was conditioned on becoming registered with the New York
Stock exchange, and in order to become registered with the exchange,
persons must sign a standard arbitration agreement.
Just as with arbitration clauses found in employee handbooks, how-
ever, signed arbitration agreements might be better analyzed under the
same standards as covenants-not-to-compete. 97 In order to maximize the
92. See Hope v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. Rptr. 851, 852-53 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 910 (1982).
93. See Weston v. ITr-CFC, 8 IER Cases 503 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 3, 1992) (Plaintiffs ar-
gued that the arbitration agreement was an adhesion contract because signing the agree-
ment was made a condition of further promotion and pay raises); Hampton, 829 F. Supp. at
204. See generally BALES, supra note 11, at 55 (discussing the "severability doctrine,"
whereby courts may adjudicate attacks on the making of an arbitration provision, but not
on the contract as a whole).
94. Other commentators may argue, however, that employers should structure the ar-
bitration agreement as a stand-alone agreement with no mention that the agreement is an
employment agreement in order to avoid the possibility that a court would not enforce the
agreement under the Federal Arbitration Act § 1 exclusion of employment contracts. See
Barreca & Levine, supra note 21, at 26. Given that the majority of courts have limited the
section 1 exclusion to "workers employed in the transportation industries or engaged in the
actual movement of goods in interstate commerce," such a concern may be unwarranted.
See supra text accompanying notes 20-41 for a discussion of the interpretations of the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act section 1 exclusion.
95. 371 N.W.2d 454, 455-56 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985).
96. See id. at 457.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 78-87.
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possibility that the agreements will be enforced, employers will want to
ensure that there is adequate and independent consideration for employ-
ees to sign the agreements. Whether continued employment is adequate
consideration will depend on the jurisdiction and on whether the employ-
ment is at-will. 98 Unlike the handbook provision, however, courts might
find that the mutual promises to arbitrate may constitute adequate con-
sideration, especially if the agreement recites the consideration as such.99
Many commentators, however, suggest offering some economic benefit as
consideration for the arbitration promise with existing employees. 100
C. PROVIDING INCENTIVE FOR EMPLOYEES TO SIGN MANDATORY
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
Providing an incentive, economic or otherwise to sign an agreement to
arbitrate has been one of the less problematic methods of enforcing arbi-
tration agreements with existing employees. Nevertheless, an employer
must be careful to ensure that the employee knows that the benefit is
given in exchange for the promise to arbitrate.
Some courts have held that employees must be aware of the agreement
in order to be bound by it.1 1 Thus, employers will want to take steps to
eliminate the possibility that an employee can later claim he was unaware
of the arbitration agreement, such as verbally explaining the agreement
before the employee signs it or providing a written summary or outline of
the policy. 102 Other courts have found fraudulent inducement where em-
ployees believed they were signing an agreement to receive a benefit in-
stead of signing an arbitration agreement in exchange for the benefit. For
example, in EZ Pawn Corp. v. Gonzalez,103 the plaintiff claimed he was
told to sign an agreement to enable him to begin receiving a stock option
and to continue employment with the company. The appellate court
found sufficient evidence of fraudulent inducement by the manner in
which the agreement was presented to the employee. 10 4 The Texas
Supreme Court later ordered the arbitration anyway, 10 5 but the case is
98. See supra text accompanying note 84.
99. See Barreca & Levine, supra note 21, at 31 (citing Hull v. Norcom, Inc., 750 F.2d
1547, 1550 (11th Cir. 1985)); Sauer-Getriebe KG v. White Hydraulics, Inc., 715 F.2d 348,
350 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1070 (1984); Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Louis Dreyfus
Corp., 372 F.2d 753, 758 (2d Cir. 1967).
100. See, e.g., Barreca & Levine, supra note 21, at 31.
101. See Prudential, 42 F.3d at 1304; Reese v. Commercial Credit Corp., 955 F. Supp.
567, 570 (D.S.C. 1997).
102. For example, in Kelly v. UHC Management Co., Inc., 967 F. Supp. 1240 (N.D. Ala.
1997), the employer was extremely cautious in its implementation of an arbitration policy.
Although the employer did not have the employees sign a stand-alone arbitration policy, it
included the policy in the employee handbook, had employees sign an acknowledgment
form, wrote a letter to employees explaining the policy, sent memoranda to employees
explaining the policy, trained both employees and managers regarding the arbitration pol-
icy, and sent a "broadcast e-mail" to all employees further explaining the policy. See id. at
1244-45.
103. 921 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1996, writ denied).
104. See id. at 324-25.
105. See EZ Pawn Corp. v. Mancias, 934 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding).
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useful to illustrate the manner in which some judges might view arbitra-
tion agreements as fraudulently induced if the employer is not careful in
the implementation of the agreements.
Contrary to EZ Pawn, however, is Vukasin v. D.A. Davidson & Co. 10 6
Ms. Vukasin sued her employer when another employee assaulted her at
work. The employer, however, insisted that the matter be resolved in
arbitration because the plaintiff had signed an annual performance review
that contained an arbitration clause. Along with the review, she received
a bonus of $399.99. In her affidavit, Ms. Vukasin claimed that she was
told the bonus was given to her because the company had a good year,
not in exchange for the arbitration agreement. In addition, other employ-
ees also testified that they were told that the bonuses were given because
of the company's good year and not in exchange for their promise to
arbitrate. The court would not consider her claim of fraud in the induce-
ment of the agreement, though, because it found the claim went to the
making of the agreement as a whole, and was thus, arbitrable. 10 7 Because
Ms. Vukasin claimed to have no knowledge that the bonus was given in
exchange for her promise to arbitrate, she also asserted that there was no
consideration for her signature to the arbitration agreement. The court
disagreed, however, finding that when the arbitration provision is con-
tained in a "larger unitary contract," the consideration only need go to
the contract as a whole, and not to the individual agreement to arbitrate
within.' 08
Additionally, for non-legal reasons, employers may wish to provide
some sort of economic incentive for employees to sign an arbitration
agreement. The circumstances surrounding the arbitration agreement of
Alston & Bird illustrate why employee morale may decrease when em-
ployees are forced to sign an arbitration agreement without any incentive
or input in the matter. Alston & Bird, a large Atlanta law firm, decided
to require all partners, associates, paralegals, and secretaries to sign an
arbitration agreement as a condition of employment. 0 9 The agreement
caused so much controversy that the firm subsequently modified its
terms, yet many still refused to sign it and began looking for other jobs.110
Providing some form of economic incentive for employees to sign an arbi-
tration agreement is more likely to produce favorable results while im-
proving employee morale by encouraging them to view the agreement as
a positive step toward improved employer-employee relations, rather
than yet another burden imposed on them by the employer.
106. 785 P.2d 713 (Mont. 1990).
107. See id. at 717.
108. See id.
109. See Mark Curriden, Sign It, Alston & Bird Staff Told: Presented With an Employ-
ment Contract, Firm's Employees Show Lawyerly Caution, 80 A.B.A. J. 25 (1994).
110. See id.
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IV. GOVERNMENT REACTION
The topic of mandatory arbitration has sparked so much controversy
that many legislators, as well as government and non-government organi-
zations, have taken a stand on the issue. Bills have been introduced into
Congress and some state legislatures that would prohibit or significantly
limit mandatory arbitration agreements between employers and employ-
ees, and organizations such as the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission, the National Labor Relations Board, and various lawyers' and
arbitral organizations have voiced opposition to mandatory employment
arbitration agreements. Pressure from Congress, civil rights advocates,
and attorneys' groups recently led the National Association of Securities
Dealers to Vote to eliminate its long-standing policy of implementing
mandatory arbitration agreements with registered brokers.11' Despite
this fairly strong opposition to mandatory arbitration, much of the pro-
posed reform has fallen by the wayside. However, should the dissatisfac-
tion with recent court decisions continue to grow, proposed reform and
its proponents may become more significant in the upcoming years.
A. PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE REFORM
In March of 1997, Representative Edward Markey, a Democrat from
Massachusetts, introduced H.R. 983, the Civil Rights Procedures Protec-
tion Act of 1997, into Congress. The Bill would amend eight federal stat-
utes, often used by employees in claims against employers to provide that
the "powers and procedures" specified in each statute would be exclusive
"unless after such right or claim arises the claimant voluntarily enters into
an agreement to resolve such right or such claim through arbitration or
another procedure. 11 2 The statutes amended would include Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,113 the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967,1 4 the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,1 5 the Americans With
Disabilities Act of 1990,116 Section 1977 of the Revised Statutes of the
United States," 7 the equal pay requirement under the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act of 1938,118 the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993,119 and
111. See Arbitration Elimination of Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 15.
112. H.R. 983, 105th Cong. §§ 2-10 (1997).
113. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000h-6 (1994); see H.R. 983, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997) (for pro-
posed amendment).
114. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994); see H.R. 983, 105th Cong. § 3 (1997) (for proposed
amendment).
115. 29 U.S.C. § 795 (1994); see H.R. 983, 105th Cong. § 4 (1997)(for proposed
amendment).
116. 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (1994); see H.R. 983, 105th Cong. § 5 (1997)(for proposed
amendment).
117. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994); see H.R. 983, 105th Cong. § 6 (1997)(for proposed
amendment).
118. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1994); see H.R. 983, 105th Cong. § 7 (1997)(for proposed
amendment).
119. 29 U.S.C. § 2651 (Supp. 1995); see H.R. 983, 105th Cong. § 8 (1997) (for proposed
amendment).
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the Federal Arbitration Act. 120 Senator Russell Feingold (D-Wis.) intro-
duced a similar bill in the Senate. 21
The purpose of the proposed legislation, according to Rep. Schroeder,
is to prevent "employers in all industries from forcing employees to give
up their right to go to court .... "122 Rep. Markey urged members of the
House to support the Bill because "[n]o employer should be permitted to
ask workers to check their constitutional and civil rights at the front
door."123
H.R. 983, which was referred to both the House Committee on Educa-
tion and the Workforce and the House Judiciary Committee, had forty-
seven co-sponsors-mostly Democrats-as of September 1997.124 In
September of 1996, the previously introduced bill had only ten co-spon-
sors. 12 5 The increase in support for the legislation may be due in part to
courts' increased willingness to uphold arbitration agreements unilater-
ally imposed on employees by their employers.
Similar bills were introduced in the House and Senate by Rep. Markey
and Sen. Feingold, as well as Rep. Marjorie Margolies-Mezvinsky (D-Pa.)
and Rep. Patricia Schroeder (D-Colo.) in 1994, 1995, and 1996.126 In
1994, Rep. Markey told members of Congress that the practice of requir-
ing employees to sign mandatory arbitration agreements "flies in the face
of the spirit of the anti-discrimination laws passed by Congress and on the
books of states and municipalities across the country." Each of the previ-
ous bills has met with no success in Congress, however, with most never
voted out of committee.'2 7
Some states have considered legislation that would prohibit mandatory
employment arbitration agreements.' 2 8 For example, California Sen.
Nicholas Petris introduced Senate Bill 1012, which would prohibit agree-
ments to arbitrate claims under the California Fair Employment and
Housing Act prior to the existence of such claims. 129 The Bill would have
made it an unlawful employment practice (similar to discrimination on
the basis of race, age, or gender) for
120. 9 U.S.C. § 14 (1994); see H.R. 983, 105th Cong. § 9 (1997)(for proposed
amendment).
121. See S. 63, 105th Cong. (1997).
122. 143 CONG. REC. E407 (daily ed. March 6, 1997) (statement of Rep. Markey).
123. Id.
124. See 1997 Bill Tracking H.R. 983, available in LEXIS, BLTRCK file.
125. See 1996 Bill Tracking H.R. 3748, available in LEXIS, BLTRCK file.
126. See Protection from Coercive Employment Agreements Act, S. 2012, 103d Cong.
(1994); Civil Rights Procedures Protection Act of 1994, S. 2405, 103d Cong. (1994); Civil
Rights Procedures Protection Act of 1994, S. 366, 104th Cong. (1995); and H.R. 3748, 104th
Cong. (1996).
127. See 1995 Bill Tracking S. 366, available in LEXIS, BLTRCK file.
128. It is possible that state legislation might not be upheld on federalism grounds if it is
found to conflict with the FAA. See BALES, supra note 11, at 56, for a discussion of federal
preemption of state legislation.
129. See S. 1012, Leg. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1995); see also John True, The Future of Employ-




an employer to require a current or potential employee, as a condi-
tion of employment, to submit any employment related claim to arbi-
tration, to request a current or potential employee to agree to
arbitrate any claims prior to the existence of an actual dispute, or to
discriminate against any person who has opposed forbidden employ-
ment practices, as specified.1 30
The Bill was sent to the California Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
but was not heard and was sent back to the Secretary of the Senate. 131
Furthermore, some judges and commentators have looked to the con-
gressional history of other legislation to find that Congress did not intend
mandatory employment arbitration agreements to be enforceable. For
example, then-Senator Dole's statement during the debate regarding the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, that arbitration agreements "where the parties
knowingly and voluntarily elect to use these methods" should be en-
forced, has been cited as authority for the proposition that mandatory
arbitration agreements should not be enforced when employees do not
consent or know they are giving up certain rights. 132
In addition, other commentators have suggested that Congress in-
tended for the 1991 amendments to the Civil Rights Act to encourage
arbitration as an additional remedy that would co-exist with traditional
litigation, rather than preclude arbitration. 133 An example of legislative
history that would support this proposition is the report of the House
Committee on Education and Labor, which stated in part that
[T]he use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms is intended to
supplement, not supplant the remedies provided by Title VII. Thus,
for example, the Committee believes that any agreement to submit
disputed issues to arbitration, whether in the context of a collective
bargaining agreement or an employment contract, does not preclude
the affected person from seeking relief under the enforcement provi-
sions of Title VII. 134
Some courts have also been reluctant to enforce mandatory arbitration
agreements in the claims arising out of the Americans with Disabilities
Act.135 In Riley v. Weyerhaeuser Paper Co., the court refused to enforce
the mandatory arbitration provision of a collective bargaining agreement,
finding Congressional intent to preclude waiver of judicial remedies in
the legislative history of the Act:136 "While the text of the [ADA] statute
130. S. 1012, Leg. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1995).
131. See 1995 Calif. Bill Tracking S. 1012, available in Westlaw, CA-BILLS file.
132. See True, supra note 129 (citing Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299 (9th
Cir. 1994) and 137 Cong. Rec. S15,478 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of Sen. Dole)).
133. See, e.g., Levy, supra note 67, at 468.
134. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 40(I), at 97 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 635).
135. See Levy, supra note 67, at 469; see also Collective Bargaining Arbitration Clause
No Bar to ADA Suit, 50 JAN. Disp. RESOL. J. 88 (1995) (discussing other cases in which
judges have been reluctant to enforce arbitration agreements for claims arising under the
Americans with Disabilities Act).
136. See Riley v. Weyerhaeuser Paper Co., 898 F. Supp. 324, 326-27 (W.D.N.C. 1995)
(citations omitted). See also Levy, supra note 67, at 469-471 (discussing courts' treatment
of the ADA and mandatory arbitration).
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in [42 U.S.C.] § 12112 does encourage the use of alternative means of
dispute resolution where appropriate, including arbitration, the legislative
history of the Act is unequivocal in expressing Congress's intent to pre-
clude a waiver of judicial remedies[.]' '137
B. AGENCY RESPONSE
At least two federal agencies have voiced opposition to the use of
mandatory arbitration agreements in employment relationships. 138 Both
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (NLRB) have taken action in an attempt to
ensure that employers do not deprive employees of their procedural
rights to use the agency process to contest an illegal employment
practice. 139
The EEOC issued a policy statement in 1995 opposing the use of
mandatory arbitration agreements as a condition of employment. 140 The
EEOC reiterated its support for voluntary programs for alternative dis-
pute resolution, but called mandatory agreements "unfair,' 141 identifying
"voluntariness" as one of the components of fairness.' 42 The EEOC's
policy on voluntariness states:
ADR programs developed by the Commission will be voluntary for
the parties because of the unique importance of the laws against em-
ployment discrimination requires that a federal forum always be
available to an aggrieved individual. The Commission believes that
parties must knowingly, willingly and voluntarily enter into an ADR
proceeding. Likewise, the parties have the right to voluntarily opt
out of a proceeding at any point prior to resolution for any reason,
including.., to file a lawsuit in federal district court. In no circum-
stances will a party be coerced into accepting the other party's offer
to resolve a dispute. 143
The Commission further emphasized its stand on the issue by seeking an
injunction against the River Oaks Imaging and Diagnostics Company,
which required an arbitration agreement as a condition of
137. Riley, 898 F. Supp. at 326-27 (citations omitted).
138. See Richard C. Reuben, Two Agencies Review Forced Arbitration; EEOC Gets In-
junction Against Company That Told Workers: Accept SDR or Quit, 81 A.B.A. J. 26 (1995);
Andrew W. Volin, Employment Law ADR Update 1996: News for Colorado Employers, 25
JUN. COLO. LAW. 39 (1996).
139. See Volin, supra note 138, at 140. For a discussion of cases not cited below in
which the EEOC and NLRB have taken a stand against mandatory employment arbitra-
tion agreements, see Levy, supra note 67, at 477-79; Lewton, supra note 4, at 1026-28. It is
unclear, however, whether agencies such as the NLRB and EEOC have the authority to
prohibit mandatory arbitration. See, e.g., BALES, supra note 11, at 84-88 (arguing the
EEOC has no authority to interpret the FAA).
140. See David E. Rovella, EEOC Says No to Forced Arbitration, NAT'L L.J., June 5,
1995, at B1; EEOC: ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION POLICY, July 17, 1995 (on file
with SMU Law Review).
141. Reuben, supra note 138; Rovella, supra note 140.
142. See EEOC: ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION POLICY, supra note 140.
143. Id. at 7302.
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employment. 144
The River Oaks policy stated that refusal to sign the agreement would
"be deemed a voluntary termination initiated by the employee."'1 45 The
policy was instituted after several employees had filed sexual harassment
complaints against the company. 146 Two employees were terminated for
refusing to sign the arbitration agreement until they had consulted a law-
yer, despite the fact that the cover letter attached to the agreement sug-
gested that employees consult a lawyer before signing the agreement. 147
The EEOC subsequently filed suit against the company. The court issued
a preliminary injunction against River Oaks, stating that the policy was
"so misleading and against the principles of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 that its use violates such law."'1 48 The case ultimately
settled. 149
The National Labor Relations Board brought suit against two employ-
ers in Florida for their allegedly unfair employee arbitration agree-
ments.150 The first, against Bentley's Luggage Corporation, involved an
employee who was fired from his part-time sales job with Bentley's for
refusing to sign an arbitration agreement that the company asked its em-
ployees to sign. 151 Bentley's settled with the NLRB, returning the em-
ployee to his job and awarding him back pay of $13,728.152 In addition,
Bentley's amended employment agreement now informs employees that
they have access to federal agencies. 153
A second case in which the NLRB has participated involved Great
Western Financial Corporation. 154 A terminated Great Western cus-
tomer service representative filed a complaint with the NLRB after she
was allegedly terminated for talking with other employees about com-
pany problems. Great Western subsequently sued her, claiming that she
was bound by her arbitration agreement to settle the case through arbi-
tration rather than attempting to resolve it through the agency process.155
While the case was still pending decision in federal court, the NLRB
asked Great Western not to require its employees to sign mandatory arbi-
144. See E.E.O.C. v. River Oaks Imaging and Diagnostic, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA 1243) (S.D. Tex. April 19, 1995).
145. Reuben, supra note 138.
146. See L.M. Sixel, Forced Arbitration Re-Examined Amid Employee Rights Concerns,
COM. APPEAL (Memphis, TN), Feb. 4, 1996, at C3.
147. See Lewton, supra note 4, at 1027-28. The company, however, characterized their
action as "quitting." Id. at 1027.
148. River Oaks, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1243.
149. See Sixel, supra note 146.
150. See Bentley's Luggage Corp., NLRB Case No. 12-CA-16658, 1995 Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) D-4 (Sept. 25, 1995); Lara Wozniak, .Out-of-Court Settlements Face Challenge in
Court Series, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 16, 1996, at 12.
151. See Wozniak, supra note 150.
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. See Great Western Financial Corp., NLRB Case No. 12-CA-166866, 1995 Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) D-4 (Sept. 25, 1995).
155. See Wozniak, supra note 150.
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tration agreements, 156 illustrating the agency's concern with preemption
by mandatory arbitration.
Private lawyers' organizations have joined the debate as well. A group
of plaintiffs' employment lawyers in California threatened a boycott of a
provider of alternative dispute resolution services if it continued to accept
disputes brought under mandatory arbitration provisions. 157 The Ameri-
can Bar Association Section of Labor and Employment Law, by contrast,
has been unable to come to an agreement on whether mandatory arbitra-
tion agreements are proper.158 The organization endorsed A Due Process
Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising Out
of the Employment Relationship without ever reaching a consensus on the
issue. 159 The Protocol, which was also endorsed by the American Arbi-
tration Association, 160 was developed by the Dunlop Commission, a
multi-partisan task force composed of persons from management, em-
ployment, and government.' 6' Because the Dunlop Commission could
not reach a consensus on the issue, it listed four differing views on the
subject of mandatory arbitration including:
[1.] Employers should be able to create mediation and/or arbitration
systems to resolve statutory claims, but any agreement to mediate
and/or arbitrate disputes should be informed, voluntary, and not a
condition of initial or continued employment.
[2.] Employers should have the right to insist on an agreement to
mediate and/or arbitrate statutory disputes as a condition of ... em-
ployment. Postponing such an agreement until a dispute actually
arises, when there will likely exist a stronger predisposition to liti-
gate, will result in very few agreements to mediate and/or arbitrate,
thus negating the likelihood of effectively utilizing alternative dis-
pute resolution and overcoming the problems of administrative and
judicial delays which now plague the system.
[3.] Employees should not be permitted to waive their right to judi-
cial relief of statutory claims arising out of the employment relation-
ship for any reason.
156. See id.
157. See Volin, supra note 138, at 40.
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. See AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL RULES FOR THE RESOLU-
TION OF EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES; ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION RULES, supra note 6, at
3.
161. See Michael J. Molony, Jr., A-Mazing! A Due Process Protocol for Mediation and
Arbitration of Employment Law Disputes, 44 LA. B.J. 126, 126 n.1 (1996).
The Dunlop Commission (named for Professor Dunlop of Harvard Univer-
sity who served on the commission) was created by the United States Secre-
taries of Labor and Commerce in 1993 to study labor and employment issues
and to make recommendations about matters particularly concerned with the
employer-employee relationship. One section of the report dealt with em-
ployment litigation and dispute resolution issues.
Id. at 126 n.1. Members of the Commission represented organizations such as the Ameri-
can Bar Association, the National Academy of Arbitrators, the Society of Professionals in
Dispute Resolution, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, the National Employ-
ment Lawyers Association, and the American Civil Liberties Union. See id. at 127 n.2.
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[4.] Employers should be able to create mediation and/or arbitra-
tion systems to resolve statutory claims, but the decision to mediate
and/or arbitrate individual cases should not be made until after the
dispute arises.162
The Commission refused to take a position on the timing of arbitration
agreements, but did agree that such agreements should be "knowingly
made."163





Proponents of the enforcement of mandatory arbitration agreements
between employers and employees cite the legislative history of the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act and the Supreme Court's holding in Gilmer v. Inter-
stateJohnson Lane Corp. as authority for enforcing such agreements.
The stated purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act was to "place arbitra-
tion agreements on the same footing as other contracts."' 64 Although
opponents of the enforcement of mandatory arbitration agreements state
that such agreements would not be enforceable contracts because of the
adhesive nature of the agreement and unequal bargaining power between
the parties, Gilmer held that "[miere inequality in bargaining power [be-
tween employers and employees] is not a sufficient reason to hold that
arbitration agreements are never enforceable in the employment
context. "165
Other courts have held that arbitration agreements are not unenforce-
able adhesion contracts because the agreements, in general, do not favor
employers. 166 The terms of arbitration are equally favorable to each side
because both sides are mutually agreeing to give up a right to a jury
trial. 167 In addition, proponents cite the courts' willingness to resolve any
doubts relating to the arbitrability of an issue in favor of arbitration.
168
These proponents argue that the courts' favoritism reflects public policy
in support of arbitration.
B. ANTI-ENFORCEMENT ARGUMENTS
Other commentators have been unequivocal in their disdain for
mandatory arbitration agreements between employers and employees.
162. A Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Aris-
ing out of the Employment Relationship 1-2, May 9, 1995 (on file with SMU Law Review).
163. Id. at 2.
164. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24.
165. Id. at 33.
166. See Golenia, 915 F. Supp. at 204.
167. See id.
168. See Rojas, 87 F.3d at 748.
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One judge characterized arbitration clauses in employment agreements,
"or worse yet, [on] the back sides of employment applications," as the
result of unequal bargaining power. 169 Even harsher are those who be-
lieve that employees are forced to "[sign] away their right not to be dis-
criminated against."'1 70 They argue that the public policy of protecting
the victims of sexual discrimination and harassment is at least as strong as
the public policy in favor of arbitration.171
Another argument is that procedural protection and remedies can dif-
fer significantly in arbitration, and plaintiffs should only be forced to
forego those rights if they have knowingly and voluntarily agreed to do
so. The Supreme Court has suggested that it would be less willing to
enforce arbitration agreements that tried to limit an employee's proce-
dural protection and remedies even further by severely limiting a plain-
tiff's rights to discovery or damages. 172
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the trend among courts today has been to enforce most
mandatory arbitration agreements between employers and employees, a
different policy should be considered when such agreements are not truly
voluntary. Arbitration has significant benefits for both employers and
employees, but if an employer wishes to take advantage of such benefits,
it should fully explain the procedure and benefits to the employee and
obtain voluntary consent, in order to allow the employee to make an in-
formed decision.
Enforcing arbitration provisions that are contained in innocuous
amendments to employee handbooks or promulgated in poorly under-
stood written policy statements without obtaining the consent and signa-
ture of employees is an egregious example of an enforcement decision
made on shaky policy ground. Employees are being bound by the terms
of an employee handbook when employers are bound by almost nothing
in the manual. The purpose behind the enactment of the Federal Arbi-
tration Act was to ensure the enforcement of arbitration agreements on
the same ground as other contracts, not on quasi-contractual standards
such as those set forth in Carlson v. Hutzel Corp.173
In addition, finding that employees who remain in their employment
after an arbitration policy is announced have consented to the policy ig-
nores the reality of the choices most employees have in employment deci-
169. Wylie Indep. Sch. Dist. v. TMC Founds., Inc., 770 S.W.2d 19, 24 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1989, writ dism'd) (Howell, J., dissenting).
170. Roy Furchgott, Earning It; Workers Who Sign Away a Day in Court, N.Y. TIMES,
July 28, 1996, § 3 at 9.
171. See Prudential, 42 F.3d at 1305. Obviously, not all disputes over arbitration arise in
the case of sexual discrimination or harassment, but the same argument could be made for
a variety of employment disputes.
172. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30-33 (discussing limits on discovery, compensatory and
punitive damages, challenges to arbitrators, and written opinions).
173. 455 N.W.2d at 338; see also supra text accompanying notes 47-51.
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sions. The typical worker cannot afford to resign his employment every
time an employment policy is changed, especially one that he casually
believes may never affect him, and the impact of which on his procedural
rights he might not understand at the time. The considerations for ex-
isting employees are different than those for a new or prospective em-
ployee who may have more flexibility in deciding that he may not wish to
commence employment with an employer who already has a mandatory
arbitration policy. Such a decision is made at a time when an employee
has less to lose than does a current employee who has been building sen-
iority and other benefits with the employer for some time. Unlike cur-
rent employees, who have become dependent on the steady income they
derive from their employer and cannot always afford to resign and look
for a new job, prospective employees are already in the job-search pro-
cess, and can more easily search for a different job with more desirable
employment policies.
In addition, analogizing mandatory arbitration provisions added to em-
ployment policies to other dissimilar terms of employment that employ-
ees must choose to accept or else resign involves somewhat faulty logic.
In the past, arbitration clauses have been likened to changes in pay struc-
ture, drug testing, and other terms of employment that are relevant to the
employee during his or her tenure of employment. Arbitration agree-
ments should instead be likened to covenants-not-to-compete, the en-
forcement of which likely will not arise, if at all, until after employment
has been terminated. Although an employer may have the right to condi-
tion continued employment on a new term of employment, the employer
should not have the right to bind the employee to a post-termination
agreement without independent consideration. Most jurisdictions require
independent and adequate consideration before non-compete covenants
entered into after the commencement of employment are enforced, and
the same should be required to enforce arbitration agreements entered
into between employers and their existing employees.
The same rationale applies to the compelled signature of arbitration
agreements. Such contracts are often not the result of arms-length bar-
gaining, and although this alone may not be enough to make them unen-
forceable,'174 the fact that they lack consideration other than the
continuation of employment should make such agreements suspect. Just
as with the amendments to employee handbooks, the coerced signature
of agreements to arbitrate should be analogized to covenants not to com-
pete, and should require independent consideration.
If employers continue unilaterally to impose mandatory arbitration
agreements on employees, more cases will be publicized in which employ-
ers have instituted mandatory arbitration with biased terms and proce-
dures. Should this scenario occur, the likelihood of Congress passing
legislation prohibiting mandatory arbitration agreements altogether will
174. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33.
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increase, and employers may lose the opportunity to take advantage of
the expediency and other merits of a balanced and non-biased alternative
dispute resolution process. Employers who wish to arbitrate their dis-
putes with employees should implement such policies fairly, by making
the terms and procedures for arbitration balanced, obtaining informed
and voluntary assent from the employees, and by providing consideration
in exchange for the employee's voluntary promise to arbitrate. Employ-
ers can wait to enact arbitration agreements with individual employees
until a time when they are already planning to grant them a significant
benefit such as a promotion, stock options, or a pay raise.175
One employer has had tremendous success in obtaining consent to
mandatory arbitration provisions by eliminating the at-will nature of the
employee's employment in exchange for the consent.176 Providing even a
small benefit will usually eliminate the consideration issues, and may im-
prove employee morale. If the employer finds arbitration to be an attrac-
tive alternative to litigation, then the costs of obtaining truly voluntary
arbitration agreements with employees should outweigh the cost of their
implementation. If not, employers may find that "rather than avoiding
litigation altogether, they have simply substituted one kind of litigation
for another."'1 77
175. See Barreca & Levine, supra note 21, at 30. See also Modern Controls, 578 F.2d at
1267 (suggesting that independent consideration in the case of a covenant not to compete
entered into after the commencement of employment might include "a raise, a new posi-
tion, or an increased employment term").
176. See Barreca & Levine, supra note 21, at 30. Eliminating the at-will nature of em-
ployment for certain employees may be undesirable, however, for reasons not discussed
herein.
177. Lewton, supra note 4, at 994.
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